A complete and strongly anonymous leximin relation on infinite streams by Asheim, Geir & Zuber, Stéphane
Soc Choice Welf (2013) 41:819–834
DOI 10.1007/s00355-012-0705-z
ORIGINAL PAPER
A complete and strongly anonymous leximin relation
on infinite streams
Geir B. Asheim · Stéphane Zuber
Received: 27 July 2011 / Accepted: 3 October 2012 / Published online: 13 October 2012
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
Abstract Various extensions of the leximin order to the infinite dimensional set-
ting have been suggested. They relax completeness and strong anonymity. Instead, by
removing sensitivity to generations at infinite rank this paper defines a complete and
strongly anonymous leximin relation on infinite streams. The order is axiomatized,
and it is shown to be the limit of extended rank-discounted utilitarianism for any utility
function, as the discount factor approaches zero.
JEL Classification D63 · D71
1 Introduction
Maximin—which is often identified with Rawls’s (1999) ‘difference principle’ and
which in the intergenerational setting is the principle of giving extreme priority to the
generation whose consumption has lowest rank—satisfies procedural equity: it treats
generations equally by not being dependent on the sequence in which generations
appear. However, it is only sensitive to the interests of the worst off generation.
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In order to enhance sensitivity, Sen (1970) suggested maximin in its lexicographic
form. This criterion, referred to as leximin, gives extreme priority to the generation
whose consumption has lowest rank, while taking into account a generation whose
consumption has higher rank if and only if there are ties at all lower ranks. In a finite
setting, it is a complete, reflexive and transitive criterion which satisfies both proce-
dural equity (by being indifferent to all permutations) and the strong Pareto principle
(by being sensitive to each component of the consumption vector).
However, in a setting where an infinite, but countable, number of generations follow
each other in sequence, it is impossible to combine the strong Pareto principle with
full procedural equity (referred to as the axiom of strong anonymity), as shown by
Van Liedekerke and Lauwers (1997). Moreover, any explicitly described complete,
reflexive and transitive preferences satisfying the strong Pareto principle cannot even
be combined with a weaker form of procedural equity (referred to as the axiom of finite
anonymity) where the social evaluation is indifferent to only finite permutations; this
is the Lauwers–Zame impossibility result (Lauwers 2010; Zame 2007).
To resolve the dilemma that arises due to the Lauwers–Zame impossibility result,
completeness is usually dropped when leximin is extended to an infinite setting, while
observing the strong Pareto principle and indifference to finite permutations (See
Asheim 2010, Section 4, for an overview of this literature).
An alternative approach to the problem of extending leximin to an infinite set-
ting is to start with maximin defined by the objective function inf t∈Nxt , where xt is
the consumption (indicating the wellbeing) of generation t . Recall that maximin is a
complete, reflexive and transitive criterion satisfying the axiom of strong anonymity,
even in the infinite setting. One can then ask how much sensitivity to the interests of
any one generation can be introduced without producing a conflict with completeness
and the axiom of strong anonymity. The present paper shows that the conflict arises
only when trying to take into account generations whose consumption has infinite
rank.
In the context of an extreme prioritarian criterion like leximin, one can argue that
the interests of generations whose consumption has infinite rank should not matter,
as for any such generation there are infinitely many generations that are worse off.
Consequently, in the present paper we restrict the domain of the strong Pareto prin-
ciple to finitely ranked generations, while retaining completeness and the axiom of
strong anonymity. This produces a complete, reflexive and transitive leximin criterion
which is fully procedurally equitable by satisfying the axiom of strong anonymity,
but which does not take into account generations whose consumption has infinite
rank.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we introduce the framework of our
analysis. In Sect. 3 we define and provide an axiomatic foundation for the new lex-
imin criterion for infinite consumption streams and discuss its properties. In Sect. 4
we show how the proposed leximin criterion is related to the extended rank-depen-
dent utilitarian criterion recently introduced and analyzed by Zuber and Asheim
(2012). In Sect. 5 we show how this new leximin criterion is related to other lex-
imin criteria suggested in the infinite setting, while in Sect. 6 we offer concluding
remarks.
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2 The framework
Let N denote as usual the set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3, . . . }. Let R denote the set of
real numbers, and R+ the set of nonnegative real numbers.
Denote by x = (x1, x2, . . . , xt , . . . ) an infinite stream (or allocation), where xt ∈
R+ is a one-dimensional indicator of the wellbeing of generation t . We refer to this
indicator as the consumption of generation t , restrict attention to allocations consisting
of bounded consumption streams, and denote by
X =
{
x = (x1, . . . , xt , . . .
) ∈ RN+ : supt xt < +∞
}
the set of possible allocations.
For x, y ∈ X, write x ≥ y whenever xt ≥ yt for all t ∈ N; write x > y if x ≥ y and
x = y; and write x  y whenever xt > yt for all t ∈ N. For any T ∈ N and x, y ∈ X,
denote by xTy the consumption stream z such that zt = xt for all t ≤ T and zt = yt
for all t > T . For any z ∈ R+ and x ∈ X, denote by (z, x) the stream (z, x1, x2, . . . ).
A permutation π is a one-to-one map from N onto N. For any x ∈ X and permu-
tation π , write xπ = (xπ(1), xπ(2), . . . ) ∈ X. Permutations can be represented by a
permutation matrix, P = (pi j )i, j∈N, which is an infinite matrix satisfying:
(1) For each i ∈ N, pi j (i) = 1 for some j (i) ∈ N and pi j = 0 for all j = j (i).
(2) For each j ∈ N, pi( j) j = 1 for some i( j) ∈ N and pi j = 0 for all i = i( j).
Given any permutation π , there is a permutation matrix P such that, for any x ∈
X, xπ = (xπ(1), xπ(2), . . . ) = Px. Conversely, given any permutation matrix P ,
there is a permutation π defined by π = Pa, where a = (1, 2, 3, . . . ). The set of all
permutations is denoted by P .
A finite permutation π is a permutation such that there is T ∈ N with π(t) = t for
all t > T . Thus, a finite permutation matrix has ptt = 1 for all t > T for some T ∈ N.
The set of all finite permutations is denoted by F .
Given a permutation matrix P ∈ P and T ∈ N, we denote the T × T matrix
(pi j )i, j∈{1,...,T } by P(T ). Let
S = {P ∈ P : there is some k ∈ N such that, for each T ∈ N,
P(kT ) is a finite dimensional permutation matrix}
denote the set of fixed-step permutations.
Two subsets of X will be of particular interest. First, we introduce the set X+ of
non-decreasing streams in X. This set is defined as follows: X+ = {x ∈ X : xt ≤
xt+1,∀t ∈ N}.
The second subset of X, playing a key role in the remainder of the paper, is the set
of allocations, X¯, whose elements can be permuted into non-decreasing streams. This
set is defined as follows: X¯ = {x ∈ X : ∃P ∈ P, Px ∈ X+}.
The following inclusions hold: X+ ⊂ X¯ ⊂ X. In a finite setting, X¯ would be the
same as X. To see why this does not hold in an infinite setting, consider the stream
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x = (1, 0, 0, . . . ). For any permutation π , it must be that π(1) < +∞ so that any
reordered stream has the form (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . ). Hence, x cannot be reordered
to form a non-decreasing stream.
To characterize the set X¯, let for each τ ∈ N the function rτ : X → N ∪ {∞} be
defined by rτ (x) = |{t ∈ N : xt < xτ }| + 1 for all x ∈ X. Refer to rτ (x) as the rank
of generation τ , and say that generation τ ’s rank is finite if rτ (x) < +∞.
Lemma 1 An allocation x ∈ X belongs to X¯ if and only if, for all t ∈ N, generation
t’s rank is finite.
Proof This is a restatement of Lemma 1 of Zuber and Asheim (2012). unionsq
Let the function  : X → R+ be defined by (x) = lim inf t→+∞ xt for all x ∈ X;
note that this function is well-defined since streams in X are bounded. By letting, for
all x ∈ X, L(x) denote {t ∈ N : xt < (x)}, we obtain the following alternative
characterization (Zuber and Asheim 2012, Proposition 1):
(a) If an allocation x ∈ X satisfies |L(x)| < +∞, then x belongs to X¯ if and only if
xt ≤ (x) for all t ∈ N.
(b) If an allocation x ∈ X satisfies |L(x)| = +∞, then x belongs to X¯ if and only if
xt < (x) for all t ∈ N.
For x ∈ X¯, denote by x[ ] = (x[1], x[2], . . . , x[r ], . . . ) the non-decreasing infinite
allocation which is a permutation of x; i.e., there exists P ∈ P such that x[ ] = Px ∈
X+. Note that the permutation matrix P need not be unique (for instance, if for some
t = t ′, xt = xt ′ , so that rt (x) = rt ′(x)), but the resulting non-decreasing allocation
x[ ] is unique. In particular, it holds for all t ∈ N that x[rt (x)] = xt . Likewise, for
x ∈ X, denote by (x[1], . . . , x[|L(x)|]) the non-decreasing finite allocation which is a
permutation of the elements of x satisfying t ∈ L(x).
A social welfare relation (SWR) on a set X is a binary relation , where for any
x, y ∈ X, x  y entails that the consumption stream x is deemed socially at least as
good as y. Let ∼ and  denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts of . An SWR
′ is a subrelation to SWR ′′ if for all x, y ∈ X, (a) x ∼′ y ⇒ x ∼′′ y and (b)
x ′ y ⇒ x ′′ y.
3 Axiomatic foundation
The difficulty of combining equal treatment of an infinite number of generations with
sensitivity to the interests of each of these generations has been the topic of a pro-
lific literature since the seminal contribution by Diamond (1965). Although complete
social preferences over infinite streams that combine equal treatment with Paretian
sensitivity exist (Svensson 1980), they cannot be explicitly described (Basu and Mitra
2003; Zame 2007; Lauwers 2010).
In this section we show how this impossibility is overcome by requiring only sensi-
tivity to the interests of generations whose consumption has finite rank. In Subsect. 3.1
we first introduce the Pareto axiom restricted to non-decreasing streams together with
other axioms used to characterize the leximin criterion we propose. In Subsect. 3.2 this
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criterion is then formally defined and fully characterized. In Subsect. 3.3 we discuss
the properties of this criterion, in particular, that it is sensitive (only) to the interests
of generations whose consumption has finite rank, and satisfies full procedural equity.
3.1 Axioms
Axiom O (Order) The SWR  is complete, reflexive and transitive on X.
An SWR satisfying axiom O is named a social welfare order (SWO).
Axiom M (Monotonicity) For any x, y ∈ X, if x > y, then x  y.
Axiom M is implied by the strong Pareto principle.
We then consider an axiom requiring sensitivity to the interests of each generation
when comparing non-decreasing streams.
Axiom RSP (Restricted Strong Pareto) For any x, y ∈ X+, if x > y, then x  y.
We now turn to an axiom combining Koopmans’ (1960) stationarity axiom (Pos-
tulate 4) with his separability Postulate 3b (the axiom requiring that the evaluation
of two streams with the same present consumption not depend on what that level of
consumption is).
Axiom IF (Independent Future) For any x, y ∈ X and z ∈ R+, (z, x)  (z, y) if and
only if x  y.
If we extended our framework to also include comparisons at future times, then axiom
IF would imply time consistency provided the SWR  is time invariant.
Next, we state two continuity axioms which have been weakened by restricting the
domains of the streams x1, x2, . . . , xk, . . . and the domain of the stream x to which
this sequence converges to. Note that their use of the product topology is justified by
means of prioritarianism for the worse-off because x is required to belong to X+.
Axiom RC1 (Restricted Continuity 1) For any x ∈ X+ and y ∈ X, if a sequence
x1, x2, . . . , xk, . . . of allocations in X is such that limk→∞
∑
t∈N |xkt − xt |2−t = 0
and, for each k ∈ N, xkt ∈ {xt , yt } for all t ∈ N and xk  y (resp. xk  y), then x  y
(resp. x  y).
Axiom RC2 (Restricted Continuity 2) For any x ∈ X+ and y ∈ X, if a sequence
x1, x2, . . . , xk, . . . of allocations in X is such that limk→∞
∑
t∈N |xkt − xt |2−t = 0
and, for each k ∈ N, there exists Pk ∈ P satisfying xk ≥ Pky (resp. xk ≤ Pky), then
x  y (resp. x  y).
Imposed continuity axioms must be restricted since, of course, an unrestricted con-
tinuity axiom is not compatible with leximin. Axiom RC1 is clearly weaker than
unrestricted continuity (as only binary consumption choices are considered), while
axiom RC2 is weaker than unrestricted continuity if  satisfies axioms M and SA
since then xk ≥ Pky (resp. xk ≤ Pky) implies xk  y (resp. xk  y) while the
converse implication does not hold.
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Finally, we state the strong axiom of procedural equity, requiring social indifference
with respect to all permutation matrices P ∈ P .
Axiom SA (Strong Anonymity) For any P ∈ P and x ∈ X, x ∼ Px.
While the axiom of finite anonymity (i.e., anonymity in its weaker form, involving only
finite permutations) is too weak—as it “only guarantees impartiality for a (negligibly)
small part of the utility stream” (Van Liedekerke and Lauwers 1997, p. 165)—axiom
SA might be too strong—as it produces hard-to-defend indifferences between streams
(Lauwers 2011). We provide a discussion of the appropriateness of axiom SA in Sub-
sect. 3.3.
3.2 Characterization
In this subsection we completely characterize the class of SWOs satisfying axioms O,
M, RSP, IF, RC1, RC2 and SA. As a first step, we do so within the restricted domain
X¯ of streams that can be reordered into non-decreasing streams.
Definition 1 Strongly anonymous leximin SWO. An SWR LP on X¯ is a strongly
anonymous leximin SWO (SAL SWO) if, for any x, y ∈ X¯, x ∼LP y if and only if
x[ ] = y[ ] and x LP y if and only if there exists R ∈ N such that x[r ] = y[r ] for all
r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and x[R] > y[R].
Note that LP satisfies completeness and reflexivity on X¯ as, for any x, y ∈ X¯, x[ ] =
y[ ] or there exists R ∈ N such that x[r ] = y[r ] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R−1} and x[R] = y[R].
Showing that LP satisfies transitivity on X¯ is equally straightforward. Hence, LP is
an order on X¯.
Proposition 1 If an SWR  on X¯ satisfies axioms O, RSP, IF, RC1 and SA, then it
is an SAL SWO.
The proof of this result is based on the following intuition: Axiom RC1, with its use
of the product topology combined with the requirement that the stream x to which
x1, x2, . . . , xk, . . . converges belong to X+, induces priority for a worse off genera-
tion. Axioms IF and SA imply that the priority for the worse off generation in conflicts
between two generations cannot depend on the number of generations that have con-
sumption levels in-between. This has as consequence that the priority must be extreme.
Proof of Proposition 1 Assume that x, y ∈ X¯ and that an SWR  on X¯ satisfies axioms
O, RSP, IF, RC1 and SA. Since LP is complete, it is sufficient to show that x ∼LP y
implies x ∼ y and x LP y implies x  y.
x ∼LP y implies x ∼ y. Assume x ∼LP y. By Definition 1, x[ ] = y[ ]. By O and SA,
x ∼ y.
x LP y implies x  y. Assume x LP y. By Definition 1, there exists R ∈ N such
that x[r ] = y[r ] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and x[R] > y[R]. Construct x˜, y˜ ∈ X+ as
follows: (i) x[t] = x˜t = y˜t = y[t] for t ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1}, (ii) x[R] = x˜R > y˜R = y[R],
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and (iii) x˜t = x˜ = infr>R x[r ] and y˜t = y˜ = supr>R y[r ] for t > R. It suffices to show
x˜  y˜ as this implies x  y by axioms O, RSP and SA.
In the case where x˜ ≥ y˜, then x˜  y˜ follows directly from axiom RSP. Hence,
assume that x˜ < y˜ and suppose x˜  y˜. Consider the following sequence y˜1, y˜2, . . . ,
y˜k, . . . of allocations in X:
y˜kt =
{
x˜ if t = R + 1, . . . R + k ,
y˜t otherwise.
It follows from repeated application of axioms IF and SA that, for each k ∈ N, x˜  y˜k .
This in turn, by axiom RC1, implies that x˜  y˜∞ where
y˜∞t =
{
x˜ if t > R ,
y˜t otherwise,
since y˜∞ ∈ X+, limk→∞ ∑t∈N |y˜kt − y˜∞t |2−t = 0, and for each k ∈ N, y˜kt ∈ {y˜t , x˜t }
for all t ∈ N. However, this contradicts that, by axiom RSP, x˜  y˜∞. Hence, x˜  y˜
also in the case where x˜ < y˜. unionsq
A second step is to extend the SAL SWO to the entire domain X without conflict
with any of the axioms O, M, RSP, IF, RC1, RC2 and SA. To do so, define, for any
x ∈ X, x¯ as follows:
{
x¯t = min{xt , (x)} for all t ∈ N if |L(x)| < +∞
x¯ is the subsequence of x consisting of all xt with t ∈ L(x) if |L(x)| = +∞
Lemma 1 implies that, by construction, x¯ belongs to X¯; therefore x¯[ ] is well-defined.
Definition 2 Extended strongly anonymous leximin SWO. An SWR LP on X is an
extended strongly anonymous leximin SWO (ESAL SWO) if, for any x, y ∈ X, x ∼LP
y if and only if x¯[ ] = y¯[ ] and x LP y if and only if there exists R ∈ N such that
x¯[r ] = y¯[r ] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and x¯[R] > y¯[R].
Proposition 2 The ESAL SWO LP on X satisfies axioms O, M, RSP, IF, RC1, RC2
and SA.
Proof The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom O. This follows from the facts that SAL SWO
is an order and x¯[ ] is well-defined for any x ∈ X.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom M. Assume x > y so that (x) ≥ (y). Suppose
x ≺LP y, implying that there exists R ∈ N such that x¯[r ] = y¯[r ] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R−1}
and x¯[R] < y¯[R] ≤ (y) ≤ (x). Hence,
|{t ∈ N : xt < y¯[R]}| ≥ R > R − 1 = |{t ∈ N : yt < y¯[R]}|.
However, as x > y, {t ∈ N : xt < y¯[R]} ⊆ {t ∈ N : yt < y¯[R]}, leading to a
contradiction. Hence, by axiom O, x LP y.
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The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom RSP. The ESAL SWO corresponds to the SAL
SWO on X¯ ⊇ X+, and the SAL SWO satisfies axiom RSP.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom IF. Consider any x, y ∈ X and z ∈ R+, and
write x′ = (z, x) and y′ = (z, y). Suppose x ≺LP y, so that there exists R ∈ N
such that x¯[r ] = y¯[r ] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and x¯[R] < y¯[R]. If z ≤ x¯R , then
x¯ ′[r ] = y¯′[r ] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R} and x¯ ′[R+1] < y¯′[R+1]. If z > x¯R , then x¯ ′[r ] = y¯′[r ]
for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and x¯ ′[R] < min{z, y¯[R]} = y¯′[R]. In either case, x′ ≺LP y′,
establishing by axiom O that (z, x) LP (z, y) implies x LP y. The converse follows
likewise by showing that (z, x) ≺LP (z, y) implies x ≺LP y.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom RC1. Consider any x ∈ X+ and y ∈ X. Let the
sequence x1, x2, . . . , xk, . . . of allocations in X be such that, for each k ∈ N, xkt ∈
{xt , yt } for all t ∈ N and xk LP y. Suppose x ≺LP y, so that there exists R ∈ N such
that xr = y¯[r ] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and xR < y¯[R]. Since y¯[R] ≤ (y), |{t ∈
N : yt < y¯[R]}| = R − 1, implying since, for each k ∈ N, xkt ∈ {xt , yt } for all
t ∈ N and xk LP y that limk→∞
∑
t∈N |xkt − xt |2−t ≥ |y¯R − xR |2−R > 0. Hence,
if limk→∞
∑
t∈N |xkt − xt |2−t = 0, then x LP y, by axiom O. Likewise if, for each
k ∈ N, xkt ∈ {xt , yt } for all t ∈ N and xk LP y.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom RC2. Consider any x ∈ X+ and y ∈ X. Let the
sequence x1, x2, . . . , xk, . . . of allocations in X be such that, for each k ∈ N, there
exists Pk ∈ P satisfying xk ≥ Pky. Suppose x ≺LP y, so that there exists R ∈ N such
that xr = y¯[r ] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and xR < y¯[R]. Since y¯[R] ≤ (y), |{t ∈
N : yt < y¯[R]}| = R − 1, implying since, for each k ∈ N, there exists Pk ∈ P
satisfying xk ≥ Pky that limk→∞ ∑t∈N |xkt − xt |2−t ≥ |y¯R − xR |2−R > 0. Hence, if
limk→∞
∑
t∈N |xkt − xt |2−t = 0, then x LP y, by axiom O. Likewise if there exists
Pk ∈ P satisfying xk ≤ Pky.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom SA. For any x ∈ X, if there exists P ∈ P such that
y = Px, then (y) = (x) (as infinite permutations preserve lim inf) so that x¯[ ] = y¯[ ]
and x ∼LP y. unionsq
A third step is to show that the ESAL SWO is the only SWR satisfying axioms O, M,
RSP, IF, RC1, RC2 and SA on the full domain X. This follows from the following
proposition and is stated as the paper’s main theorem.
Proposition 3 If an SWO  on X satisfies axioms O, M, RC2 and SA, then x¯ ∼ x for
any x ∈ X.
Proof Let s(x) denote supt∈N xt for any x ∈ X.
Case 1: |L(x)| < +∞. Since x¯ ≤ x, it follows that x¯  x by axioms O and M. To
show x¯  x, construct, for each k ∈ N, x¯k as follows:
x¯ kt =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x¯[t] if t ≤ |L(x)|
(x) + 1k
(
s(x) − (x)) if |L(x)| + 1 ≤ t ≤ |L(x)| + k
s(x) if t > |L(x)| + k.
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By Zuber and Asheim (2012, proof of Lemma 3), there exists, for each k ∈ N, Pk ∈ P
such that x¯k ≥ Pkx. Since
∑
t∈N|x¯
k
t − x¯[t]|2−t =
( 1
k (1 − 2−k) + 2−k
)(
s(x) − (x))2−|L(x)| ,
we have that x¯[ ]  x by axiom RC2, and x¯  x by axioms O and SA.
Case 2: |L(x)| = +∞. Construct, for each k ∈ N, x¯k as follows:
x¯ kt =
{
x¯[t] if t ≤ k
s(x) if t > k.
Since there exists, for each k ∈ N, Pk ∈ P such that x¯k ≥ Pkx and, furthermore,
limk→∞
∑
t∈N |x¯ kt − x¯[t]|2−t = 0, we have that x¯[ ]  x by axiom RC2, and x¯  x
by axioms O and SA. Construct, for each k ∈ N, yk as follows:
ykt =
{
x¯[t] if t ≤ k
x¯[k] if t > k.
Since there exists, for each k ∈ N, Pk ∈ P such that yk ≤ Pkx and, furthermore,
limk→∞
∑
t∈N |ykt − x¯[t]|2−t = 0, we have that x¯[ ]  x by axiom RC2, and x¯  x
by axioms O and SA. Hence, x¯ ∼ x also in this case. unionsq
Theorem 1 Consider an SWR  on X. The following two statements are equivalent.
(1)  satisfies axioms O, M, RSP, IF, RC1, RC2 and SA.
(2)  is an ESAL SWO.
Proof (1) implies (2). This follows from Propositions 1 and 3. (2) implies (1). This
follows from Proposition 2.
3.3 Properties
We have alluded to the property that the ESAL SWO is sensitive to the interests of
generations at finite rank. The following is a formal statement of this property.
Axiom SFR (Sensitivity to Finitely Ranked generations) For any x, y ∈ X, if x > y
with xτ > yτ for some τ ∈ N satisfying rτ (x), rτ (y) < +∞, then x  y.
Axiom SFR implies axiom RSP as all generations have finite rank in a non-decreasing
stream. Since all generations along a stream in X¯ have finite rank (by Lemma 1), it
even implies that x  y whenever x, y ∈ X¯ satisfy x > y.
Extreme priority of the worse off generation in conflicts between two generations
is usually captured by the following axiom.
Axiom HE (Hammond Equity) For any x, y ∈ X, if there exist τ, τ ′ ∈ N such that
yτ < xτ < xτ ′ < yτ ′ and yt = xt for all t = τ, τ ′, then x  y.
The following result shows that the ESAL SWO satisfies these two axioms.
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Proposition 4 The ESAL SWO LP on X satisfies axioms SFR and HE.
Proof The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom SFR. Consider x and y as in the definition of
axiom SFR. The assumption that rτ (x), rτ (y) < +∞ implies that xτ ≤ (x) and
yτ ≤ (y). Since x > y, we have that (x) ≥ (y), and by the fact that the ESAL
SWO satisfies axiom M, we know that x LP y.
Suppose x ∼LP y so that x¯[ ] = y¯[ ] by the definition of the ESAL SWO. Since
limr→∞ x¯[r ] = (x) and limr→∞ y¯[r ] = (y), the case where (x) > (y) would con-
tradict x¯[ ] = y¯[ ]. Hence, consider the remaining case where yτ < xτ ≤ (x) = (y).
Then there exists R ∈ N such that
|{t ∈ N : xt ≤ yτ }| < R = |{t ∈ N : yt ≤ yτ }|.
Therefore, x[R] > yτ = y[R], contradicting that x¯[ ] = y¯[ ] also in this case.
Thus, since x LP y and x LP y, it follows that x LP x.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom HE. Consider x and y as in the definition of axiom
HE. (a) If (x) = (y) ≤ yτ , then x¯ = y¯ so that x ∼LP y by the definition of the ESAL
SWO. (b) If (x) = (y) > yτ , let R be the largest integer r such that y¯[r ] = yτ . By
the definitions of x¯[ ] and y¯[ ], it holds that x¯[r ] = y¯[r ] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and
x¯[R] > y¯[R] so that x LP y. Hence, in either case, x LP x. unionsq
Since the ESAL SWO satisfies axiom SFR, this criterion is able to strictly rank some
pairs of streams which are deemed equally good by maximin. To exemplify, consider
starting with an egalitarian stream where all generations have the same consumption
level y, and then compare this stream to the stream obtained by lifting a subset N of
the generations up to a higher consumption level x . By maximin the resulting stream
is equally good as the original egalitarian stream even if only one generation remains
at y. In contrast, by the ESAL SWO the new stream is strictly better as long as N is
cofinite, so that the set of generations remaining at y is finite.
Such increased sensitivity may change the set of optimal streams in economic mod-
els. In particular, (Cairns and Tian, 2010, Section 4) claim that, for some set of initial
conditions, there are efficient maximin streams in the Brander-Taylor model of the
Easter Island (Brander and Taylor 1998) where individual wellbeing is non-decreas-
ing and strictly increasing for a finite subinterval of time. For such initial conditions,
keeping individual wellbeing constant at its initial maximin level is optimal (although
not time-consistent) according to the maximin criterion, but not optimal according to
the ESAL SWO.
As the ESAL SWO is not sensitive to the interests of generations at infinite rank,
Theorem 1 demonstrates that sensitivity cannot be extended beyond finitely ranked
generations under axioms O, M, RSP, IF, RC1, RC2 and SA. Hence, under these
axioms the stream obtained by lifting a subset N of the generations up to a higher
consumption level x is equally good as the original egalitarian stream if there are
infinitely many generations remaining at y.
• On the one hand, given that the ESAL SWO satisfies the extreme form of prior-
itarianism that axiom HE captures, one may argue that it is reasonable that the
criterion not be sensitive to the interests of generations at infinite rank. Because if
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generation t is at infinite rank, there are infinitely many generations that are worse
off. And by axiom HE, in conflicts between two generations, the one with the
lower rank should have priority.
• On the other hand, the infinite number of generations remaining at y might appear
further and further apart so that the asymptotic density of the set of times t with
xt = y equals zero. In the context of an ordered set like time, this might be
considered problematic.
This last observation is closely related to an argument set forward by Lauwers
(2011), namely that the strong axiom of anonymity, SA, might be too strong when
applied in the setting of an infinite and ordered set like time. In particular, consider
two streams, x and y, composed only of x and y (with x > y as above), where
lim inf t→+∞ x = lim inf t→+∞ y = y and lim supt→+∞ x = lim supt→+∞ y = x .
However, in stream x, the ys appear further and further apart, so that the asymptotic
density of the set of positions t with xt = y equals 0, while in stream y, the xs appear
further and further apart, so that the asymptotic density of the set of positions t with
xt = y equals 1. By axiom SA, these streams are equally good, which might be
considered equally problematic.
In fact, axiom SA is even in conflict with the weak Pareto principle whereby one
stream is preferred to another stream if the former has higher consumption than the
latter at all times. This is demonstrated by the following adaptation of Fleurbaey and
Michel’s (2003) proof of their Theorem 1 to a setting where streams are bounded:
Consider
x =
(
1
3 ,
2
3 ,
1
4 ,
3
4 , . . . ,
1
k+2 ,
k+1
k+2 , . . .
)
y =
(
1
4 ,
1
3 ,
1
5 ,
2
3 , . . . ,
1
k+3 ,
k
k+1 , . . .
)
,
where by axiom SA x is indifferent to y even though xt > yt for all t ∈ N. Indeed,
the ESAL SWO does not satisfy the weak Pareto principle (since x ∼LP y whenever x
and y satisfy xt > yt ≥ (y) = (x) for all t ∈ N), and by the above demonstration
this feature is necessary for an SWO satisfying axiom SA.
It must however be noticed that this conflict arises even between the weak Pareto
principle and the axiom of finite anonymity. On the domain [0, 1]N, Zame (2007, Th.
4) shows that any explicitly described complete, reflexive and transitive preferences
cannot be proved to satisfy the weak Pareto principle and the axiom of finite anonymity.
This result applies to our larger domain.
The present discussion illustrates the difficult nature of the dilemma posed by the
Lauwers-Zame impossibility result. By restricting sensitivity to finitely ranked gener-
ations we have through the ESAL SWO been able to propose an explicitly described
complete, reflexive and transitive SWR that satisfies procedural equity, not only in
the sense of finite anonymity, but even in the form of axiom SA. It is an open and
interesting question whether there exist versions of leximin where sensitivity is pushed
beyond axiom SFR while retaining completeness and an appropriate form of proce-
dural equity.
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4 Limit of rank-discounted utilitarianism
The extended rank-discounted utilitarian criterion is introduced and characterized by
Zuber and Asheim (2012). This criterion coincides with discounted utilitarianism on
the set of non-decreasing consumption streams. Utility discounting is then justified as
an expression of inequality aversion when future generations are better off. However,
and contrary to the discounted utilitarian approach, extended rank-discounted utili-
tarianism also satisfies procedural equity: two intergenerational consumption streams
that are identical up to a permutation are deemed equally good. On streams that are
not non-decreasing, discounting becomes the mere expression of intergenerational
inequality aversion.
Definition 3 Extended Rank-Discounted Utilitarian SWO. An SWR on X is an
Extended Rank-Discounted Utilitarian SWO (ERDU SWO) if it is represented by
an SWF W : X → R defined by:
W (x) = u((x)) + (1 − β)
∑|L(x)|
r=1 β
r−1 (u (x[r ]
) − u((x))) , (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is a real number and the function u is continuous and increasing.
Write β,u for the ERDU SWO characterized by β and u. The following result
establishes that, for any increasing and continuous function u, the ESAL SWO LP
is the limit of the ERDU SWO β,u as β—the utility discount factor according to
rank—approaches 0.
Proposition 5 For any x, y ∈ X and any continuous and increasing function u, x LP
y if and only if there exists β¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that x β,u y for all β ∈ (0, β¯).
Proof Assume that x, y ∈ X¯, and that u is a continuous and increasing function.
Since LP is complete, it is sufficient to show that x ∼LP y implies the existence of
β¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that x ∼β,u y for all β ∈ (0, β¯), and that x LP y implies the existence
of β¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that x β,u y for all β ∈ (0, β¯).
x ∼LP y implies the existence of β¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that x ∼β,u y for all β ∈ (0, β¯).
By Definition 2, x¯[ ] = y¯[ ]. By Definition 3, x ∼β,u y for all β ∈ (0, 1).
x LP y implies the existence of β¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that x β,u y for all β ∈ (0, β¯).
By Definition 2, there exists R ∈ N such that x¯[r ] = y¯[r ] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1}
and x¯[R] > y¯[R]. Construct x˜, y˜ ∈ X+ as follows: (i) x¯[t] = x˜t = y˜t = y¯[t] for
t ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1}, (ii) x¯[R] = x˜R > y˜R = y¯[R], and (iii) x˜t = x˜ = infr>R x¯[r ] and
y˜t = y˜ = supr>T y¯[r ] for t > T . It suffices to show x˜ β,u y˜ as this implies x β,u y
because β,u satisfies axioms O, M and SA.
In the case where x˜ ≥ y˜, then x˜ β,u y˜ for all β ∈ (0, 1) follows directly because
β,u satisfies axiom RSP. Hence, assume that x˜ < y˜, and define β¯ by
(
1 − β¯) u (x˜R) + β¯u
(
x˜
) = (1 − β¯) u(y˜R
) + β¯u(y˜).
Then, by (1), x˜ ∼β¯,u y˜, and x˜ β,u y˜ for all β ∈ (0, β¯). unionsq
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Proposition 5 bears some similarities to Basu and Mitra’s (2007) robustness check
for their utilitarian SWR (Basu and Mitra 2007, p. 361).1 Their idea is to start with
the standard time-discounted utilitarian criterion and argue that the violation of pro-
cedural equity that the criterion entails is ‘small’ when the discount factor is close
to one. They show that their utilitarian SWR orders any two streams the same way
as time-discounted utilitarian criteria exhibiting appropriately ‘small’ violations of
procedural equity.
In Proposition 5, we start from the ERDU SWO rather than the time-discounted
utilitarian criterion, so that there is no violation of procedural equity, and we look at
the case where the discount factor is close to zero. This means that we concentrate
on cases where most priority is given to the poor. We show that our leximin criterion
orders any two streams the same way as ERDU criteria exhibiting appropriately ‘large’
priority to the worst off.
5 Comparison with other extensions of leximin
In the recent literature on intertemporal social choice, leximin is usually defined in
the setting of infinite consumption streams by extending the definition of leximin on
the set of finite consumption streams to the infinite setting. To consider this literature
and its relation to the present definition of leximin, let us reproduce the definition of
leximin in the finite setting.
For this purpose, denote by xT the finite stream (x1, x2, . . . , xt , . . . , xT ) and denote
by x[T] = (x[1], x[2], . . . , x[r ], . . . , x[T ]) the non-decreasing allocation which is a per-
mutation of xT; i.e., there exists P(T ) such that x[T] = P(T )xT is non-decreasing.
Then LT is defined by, for any xT, yT ∈ RT+, xT ∼LT yT if and only if x[T] = y[T]
and xT LT yT if and only if there exists R ≤ T such that x[r ] = y[r ] for all r ∈{1, . . . , R − 1} and x[R] > y[R].
In the finite setting leximin satisfies both the strong Pareto principle and anony-
mity. However, in the infinite setting, as pointed out by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003),
even the weak Pareto principle is in conflict with strong anonymity, i.e., axiom SA.
Furthermore, Zame (2007, Th. 4) demonstrates that SWOs satisfying weak Pareto can-
not be explicitly described even when finite anonymity (i.e., anonymity in its weaker
form, involving only finite permutations) is imposed. Hence, when extending leximin
to infinite streams in a manner that allows explicit description, one cannot keep both
axioms O and SA while insisting on the strong Pareto principle.
In the present paper, we have kept axioms O and SA and weakened the strong Pareto
principle, by requiring sensitivity only to generations at finite rank. Other explicitly
describable extensions of leximin to the infinite setting have all weakened axiom O.
They can be divided in two parts depending on whether completeness or transitivity
is relaxed.
Most of these extensions relax completeness. This is in particular the case of L ,
under which streams are comparable only if they eventually coincide. The SWR L
is defined as follows (cf. Asheim et al. 2010): For any x, y ∈ X, x L y if and only if
1 We thank Kohei Kamaga for making this observation.
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there exists T ∈ N such that xT LT yT and x = xTy. This criterion does satisfy axiom
SA, but fails the weak Pareto principle even for constant streams dominating each
other. Bossert et al. (2007) suggest LF , under which streams are comparable only
if they eventually coincide or Pareto-dominates each other. The SWR LF is defined
as follows: For any x, y ∈ X, x LF y if and only if there exists T ∈ N such that
xT LT yT and x ≥ xTy. This criterion satisfies the strong Pareto principle and hence
not axiom SA; rather, it satisfies finite anonymity.
Various other contributions show how comparability can be increased further by
imposing anonymity involving fixed-step permutations (Lauwers 1997; Kamaga and
Kojima 2009), different kinds of overtaking or catching-up (Asheim and Tungodden
2004; Asheim et al. 2010), or both (Asheim and Banerjee 2010; Kamaga and Kojima
2010). However, since these are explicitly described SWRs satisfying reflexivity, tran-
sitivity, finite anonymity and the strong Pareto principle, it follows from the results of
Zame (2007) and Lauwers (2010) that they are not complete.
Given the incompleteness of the leximin criteria of the previous paragraph, one
may ask whether they are subrelations to the complete leximin criterion LP . This is
not case since (1, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) is deemed socially better than (0, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) accord-
ing to all of these incomplete criteria while they are equally good according to LP :
(1, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) ∼LP (0, 0, 0, 0, . . . ).
In fact, there exist x, y ∈ X such that x LP y, while x ≺ y for any of different
overtaking or catching-up leximin criteria  considered by Asheim and Tungodden
(2004), Kamaga and Kojima (2010), Asheim et al. (2010) and Asheim and Banerjee
(2010). Since the time-invariant overtaking leximin criterion LI of Asheim et al.(2010) is a subrelation to all the other overtaking or catching-up leximin criteria, this
result is established through the following proposition.
Proposition 6 There exist x, y ∈ X such that x LP y and x ≺LI y.
To avoid the additional notation needed to define the time-invariant overtaking
leximin criterion LI , we state the following characterization.
Lemma 2 The following two statements are equivalent.
(1) x LI y,
(2) For any P ∈ P , there exists T ∈ N such that (Px)T LT (Py)T,
Proof (1) implies (2). Assume that (1) is true. As any P ∈ P maps a finite subset of N
into another finite subset of N, it follows directly from Asheim et al. (2010, Definition
4) that, for any P ∈ P , there exists T ∈ N such that (Px)T LT (Py)T.
(2) implies (1). Suppose that (1) is not true. Then, by Asheim et al. (2010, the proof
of Proposition 7), there exists P ∈ P such that (Px)T ≺LT (Py)T for all T ∈ N. This
contradicts (2). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6. Let x = (0, 1, 1, . . . , 1, . . . ) and y = (1, 12 , 13 , . . . , 1n , . . . ).
Then x¯[1] = 0 = y¯[1] and x¯[2] = 1 > 0 = y¯[2] so that x LP y. We must show that
x ≺LI y; i.e., x LI y, but not x LI y.
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x LI y is true. Consider any P ∈ P . Then there exists τ ∈ N such that xπ =
(xπ(1), xπ(2), . . . ) = Px satisfies π(τ) = 1 and xπ(τ) = 0. Choose T ≥ τ . Then
(Px)T LT (Py)T. By Lemma 2, this implies x LI y.
x LI y is not true. By Lemma 2, it suffices to show the existence of P ∈ P such
that (Px)T ≺LT (Py)T for all T ∈ N. Since xT ≺LT yT for all T ∈ N, this is obtained
by setting P equal to the identity matrix. unionsq
In his Theorem 5, Sakai (2010) considers variants of the leximin criteria satisfying
completeness and the strong Pareto principle while failing transitivity. When compar-
ing complete criteria, one SWR is a subrelation to another SWR if and only if they
are identical. The leximin variants considered by Sakai (2010) are all different from
LP as they, by the strong Pareto principle, deem (1, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) to be socially better
than (0, 0, 0, 0, . . . ). Furthermore, it cannot be shown that x LP y implies x  y for
the whole range of complete but intransitive leximin criteria  considered by Sakai
(2010).
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown that the problem of combining completeness and proce-
dural equity is resolved if one does not insist on sensitivity to the interests of generations
whose consumption has infinite rank. In fact, then one can explicitly define a version
of leximin over infinite consumption streams that is complete, reflexive and transitive,
while satisfying the strong form of procedural equity that axiom SA entails. Provided
that one adopts the extreme form of prioritarianism that leximin represents, perhaps it
is reasonable not to care about generations who are better off than an infinite number
of other generations.
It is important to note that the use of the product topology in axioms RC1 and
RC2 does not reflect impatience, but priority for the worse-off, as the stream being
approached is restricted to be non-decreasing. This entails that such prioritarianism
need not be introduced by invoking axiom HE, which usually is employed to ensure
extreme priority of the worse off generation in conflicts between two generations.
In the axiomatic foundations for discounted utilitarianism and extended rank-dis-
counted utilitarianism, impatience (in the former case) and priority for the worse-off
(in the latter case) are not introduced through the continuity axiom, as the uniform
topology is used. Rather, impatience and priority for the worse-off respectively fol-
low when such continuity is combined with versions of Koopmans’ stationarity and
separability conditions.
We have already shown that the ESAL SWO satisfies stationarity and separable
future on the set of all streams (cf. axiom IF of Sect. 3.1), and it is straightforward to
show that the criterion satisfies separable present on the set of non-decreasing streams.
It is an open question whether introducing axiom HE, while weakening axioms RC1
and RC2 to versions where the uniform topology is used, is sufficient to characterize
the ESAL SWO in view of these separability properties.
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